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BARNES V. GORMAN AND MERCER V. DUKE UNIVERSITY
THE AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
TITLE IX LITIGATION
Punitive damages can often serve to further government's "legiti-
mate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repeti-
tion."' In some civil rights litigation, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that they can serve to vindicate conduct "which is motivated by
evil motive or intent, or ... involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others."2 Over the years, however,
the Court's review of punitive damages has both carved out occa-
sional exceptions to the availability of the awards,' and interjected
constitutional constraints on the amounts of awards in other con-
texts. In 2002, in Barnes v. Gorman,5 the Court again found punitive
damages unavailable to cure wrongful conduct, this time for actions
brought under a section of the Americans with Disabilities Act.6 In
the wake of Gorman, Title IX--Congress's attempt to eliminate gen-
der discrimination in academics-found itself next on the choppinj
block in the Fourth Circuit in the case of Mercer v. Duke University.
When the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that
even intentional violations of Title IX cannot give rise to punitive
damages,9 it wrote another ignominious chapter in the law's divisive
judicial legacy. That decision, and the context in which it arose, casts
serious doubt on the future availability of punitive damages to rem-
edy even the worst intentional conduct, and has erroneously clumped
Title IX into the class of Spending Clause jurisprudence. Not faced
with the potential for punitive damages for even their most egregious
violations, schools may simply find that paying compensatory dam-
ages is cheaper than complying with Title IX.
I BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (reversing an award of punitive dam-
ages as grossly excessive and establishing constitutional parameters for state punitive awards).
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (holding that punitive damages are available in
proper § 1983 actions).
3 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999) (noting that punitive damages are un-
available under the Fair Labor Standards Act against states); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding a municipality is not liable for punitive damages for the
bad faith actions of its officials).
4 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
5 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
6 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2002).
7 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2002).
8 50 Fed. Appx. 643 (4th Cir. 2002)
9 Id. at 644.
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I
Few pieces of legislation can claim quite the celebrity status of Ti-
tle IX.' ° Originally codified as part of the Education Act Amend-
ments of 1972 with remarkably little controversy or fanfare-certainly
when compared to what it would later enjoy-Title IX provides that
"no person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assis-
tance."" In practice Title IX has been scrutinized most heavily for its
impact on collegiate athletics,' 2 which is not without a degree of irony
considering that the original language of the law contains no specific
reference to athletics at all. 3 The controversy at the heart of this
scrutiny can briefly be summarized as one where the mandated in-
creased slice of the budgetary pie to women comes at the expense-
quite literally-of men. The effects, regardless of one's perspective of
their merits, have been severe. The National Organization of Women
reports that today over 150,000 women play college athletics (com-
pared to 32,000 in 1972) and 2.8 million high school girls, or 1 in 2.5,
play varsity high school sports (compared to 1 in 27 in 1972) .4 Title
IX has so changed the nation's basic presumptions of gender and
sports that to many "the inclusion of sports in the education of young
women is currently so normal that it is hard to imagine a different
scenario." 5 Despite these gains, concerns about Title IX's negative
10 See Ted Hutton, Title IX Hits Milestone Under Attack; Political Climate, Angry Male Athletes,
Court Cases Cast Chill on 30th Anniversary, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 11, 2002,
at 1C. As Professor Epstein has noted, "The provision reads like a sex-blind requirement, but
through its administrative extensions it has led to the most coercive federal intervention on the
autonomy of all private and public institutions." Richard A. Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom:
The Intellectual Foundations of Our Constitutional Order, Address at the National Constitu-
tion Center (Mar. 30, 2004), in 6 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 657, 679 (2004).
1 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2002).
12 SeeJocelyn Samuels & Kristen Galles, In Defense of Title IX: Why Current Policies Are Required
to Ensure Equality of Opportunity, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 11, 20 n.44 (2003) (noting that the vast
majority of the nearly 10,000 comments received during the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare's comment period related to the two out of forty proposals that related to athlet-
ics).
1s See Thomas A. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1977)
("The legislative history of Title IX provides little indication whether Congress intended the
statute to apply to athletic programs."). In fact, it is important to note that Title IX has been
used effectively to combat forms of gender discrimination in other contexts in education be-
yond athletics, such as teacher-student sexual harassment in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998), student-student sexual harassment in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), and gender discriminatory admissions processes in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
14 National Organization of Women, Save Title IX, at http://www.now.org/issues/ttle_ix/
index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
15 Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gen-
der Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 51, 52 (1996).
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impact on young men still abound, and the number of men's colle-
giate teams dropped from athletic programs as a result of the legisla-
tion continues to grow."'
Admittedly all of this history, whether one views it as triumphant
or disastrous, is more a question of social science and budget alloca-
tion than it is a question of law. Title IX's legal catch derives from its
nature as more of an aspiration than any sort of affirmative regula-
tion. That is to say that the law contained only a statement about how
conduct should be, but provided no enforcement mechanism or re-
view process. Additionally, the law does not even mention from
where it derives its constitutional authority. As a result of these char-
acteristics, the litigation produced by Title IX has been both contro-
versial and groundbreaking, and has presented several challenging
issues of law." For purposes of this Note, it is relevant to note that
the development of Title IX in the early 1970s' came in the wake of
the Civil Rights legislation that flooded the American political scene
in the mid- to late-1960s. To that end, Tite IX was patterned signifi-
cantly after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but not identi-
cally. Tite IX's sponsor, Senator Birch Bayh, spoke of Title IX as
closing a "loophole" in Title VI by protecting against gender dis-
crimination.2 o
While Title IX declared, in essence, that gender discrimination
was to be a thing of the past, it problematically did not provide a
16 See Erik Brady, Major Changes Debated for Title IX, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 2002, at IA (citing
those who fault Tide IX for forcing the elimination of more than 400 men's teams as colleges
tried to balance the numbers of male and female athletes). Cf Welch Suggs, Budgets Grow as
Colleges Seek to Comply With Gender-Equity Rules, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 21, 2001 ("The 305
colleges that provided data [to the equity survey] in both 1996--97 and 2000-01 indicated that
they had added an average of 55 female athletes and 28 male athletes apiece over the four in-
tervening years."), available at http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i41/41aO4101.htm; Ups and
Downs, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 12, 2004, at 28 tbl. (depicting gains and losses for men's
teams in various collegiate sports from 1981-2002).
17 See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1984) (holding a college was sub-
ject to Title IX, even where students directly received the federal aid in loans and grants, but
college was the indirect recipient of that aid); Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath-
letic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 290 (2001) (holding that a statewide association incorporated to regu-
late interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools may be
regarded as engaging in state action).
18 For more complete legislative histories on Title IX, see Christopher Paul Reuscher,
Comment, Giving the Bat Back To Casey: Suggestions to Reform Title IX's Inequitable Application to
Intercollegiate Athletics, 35 AKRON L. REv. 117, 119-27 (2001), and Kelly S. Terry, Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools: Reviving the Presumption of Remedies Under Implied Rights of Ac-
tion, 46 ARK. L. REv. 715, 715-18 (1993).
19 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694-95 n.16 (1979). In fact, the original House
proposal for Title IX was initially phrased as an amendment to Title VI that would have made §
601 of that Title into § 601(a), and would have added the gist of what is now Title IX as §
601 (b). Id.
20 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
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procedural mechanism for accomplishing this goal absent universal,
voluntary compliance. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme
Court was presented with the question and, despite five separate
opinions among the nine Justices, held that Title IX did contain an
implied private right of action.2 ' Despite some disagreement on the
Court, the Cannon holding was, at the very least, consistent with the
Court's prior finding of an implied private right of action in Title
VI.2 2 The Court left the question of what remedies might be available
in such a suit for another day, which came in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools.2 13 Christine Franklin, a former high school stu-
dent, sought damages from her high school for failing to stop a
teacher from harassing her. She sued under Title IX, claiming gen-
der discrimination, seeking money damages from the school district
as a result of its conduct. 4 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed
two lower courts, concluding that a "damage remedy is available for
an action brought to enforce Title IX."2 5 In what would later prove
critical for Heather Sue Mercer, the Court did not further explain
the "damage remedy" in terms of either compensatory or punitive
damages. Nonetheless, it is important to take a closer look at the
Franklin analysis and its subsequent interpretation.
The Court began by proceeding under the presumption that "all
appropriate remedies" are available unless Congress expressly indi-
cates otherwise.26 The Court then attempted to answer the question,
as it had in Cannon, by looking at the state of the law at the time Title
IX was passed.27 The Court found that the prevailing common law
presumption dating back to at least the early nineteenth century was
that the denial of a remedy served as the "exception rather than the
rule.,,2s Additionally, in the decade immediately preceding the en-
actment of Title IX, the Court had found implied rights of action in
21 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Jus-
tices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and then-Justice Rehnquist joined. ChiefJustice Burger con-
curred in the judgment without opinion. Id. at 717. Justice Rehnquist also filed a concurring
opinion in which Justice Stewartjoined. Id. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion joined by
Justice Blackmun. Id. at 718. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 730.
22 Id. at 697-98.
23 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
24 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 911 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1990).
25 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
26 Id. (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979)). This was admittedly a point-
less exercise because the statute was silent on the existence of a right of action in the first place,
so it was necessarily silent as to the available remedies such an action could provide. Id. at 71.
27 Id. at 71-73.
28 Id. at 71 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 375
(1982)).
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six cases, approving remedies of damages in three of them.29 This, in
effect, had put Congress on notice of the Court's presumption of im-
plying rights and remedies. The Court furthered this argument by
examining the years after Cannon, and specifically two congressional
amendments to Title IX?' These amendments provided not only a
validation of the holding in Cannon, but went further, making
"'remedies (both at law and in equity) .. .available for such a viola-
tion.., against any public or private entity.' 3 The Court interpreted
these amendments as Congress's implied acceptance of the tradi-
tional availability of "any appropriate relief for violation of a federal
right.
3 2
The Court then addressed defendant's argument that the normal
presumption in favor of all appropriate remedies should not apply
because Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause
33power. The Court ultimately deferred deciding the constitutional
source of Congress's power in enacting Title IX,3 4 but briefly ad-
dressed the relevance of the point. In Pennhurst State School and Hospi-
tal v. Halderman, the Court had observed that remedies were limited
under Spending Clause statutes for unintentional violations.s The
Franklin Court refused to extend this logic to intentional violations,
claiming that the same notice problems for recipients of federal
money do not exist where intentional discrimination is alleged.36 The
Court further noted that prior holdings had approved monetary
29 Id. at 72 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), Wyandotte
Trans. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 207 (1967),J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433
(1964)).
30 Id. (reviewing the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §2000d-7, and the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 102 Stat. 28).
31 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000d-7(a) (2)).
32 Id. at 73. While Congress did not "expressly state the nature of the available remedies, it
was also silent as to any limits on remedies." Michael A. Cullers, Comment, The Availability of
Title IX Damages for Employees After Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 45 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1325, 1330 (1995).
33 Id. at 74. The Spending Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power To lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
M Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 n.8 (acknowledging Franklin's argument that Title IX rests on
powers derived from § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and deciding that the question need
not be answered).
35 451 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981) ("In no case ... have we required a State to provide money to
plaintiffs much less required a State to take on such open-ended and potentially burdensome
obligations as providing 'appropriate' treatment in the 'least restrictive' environment." (cita-
tions omitted)).
36 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75. Simply put, the notice problem is that the money recipient "lacks
notice that it will be liable for a monetary award." Id.
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37
awards for intentional violations of other Spending Clause statutes.
Ultimately this intentional/unintentional distinction was justified on
the grounds that an intentional wrongdoer does not deserve notice
about the consequences of his action because he should not be inten-
tionally violating the law in the first place. After finally rejecting de-
fendant's claim that Title IX remedies should be limited to backpay
and prospective relief,38 the Court concluded that a general "damages
remedy" was available under actions brought to enforce Title IX.39
The Court did not specify the type of damages, but to some commen-
tators, however, the opinion "appear[ed] to sanction both compensa-
tory and punitive damages."40 Several lower courts made a similar de-
termination, believing that Franklin's damages remedy included both
compensatory and punitive damages.
II
Throughout the 1990s, in the wake of Franklin, the tone of Tide
IX litigation began to change as federal courts, perhaps most notably
in the Cohen v. Brown University litigation, started getting more in-
volved in the administration of schools' athletic departments, forcing
gender equity upon non-complying schools. 43  All of this left some
commentators to question whether compromise was even possible in
37 Id. (referencing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (holding unanimously
that backpay was a permitted remedy for intentional violations of an employee discrimination
statute)).
The Court rested this conclusion on the nature of Title IX lawsuits-namely, that in situa-
tions where students were bringing suit, backpay was an unavailable remedy. See id. at 75-76.
39 Id. at 76.
40 Jill K. Johnson, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretation of the
Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REv. 553, 556 n.19 (1994); see also Cullers, supra note 32, at
1339 n.109 ("Since Franklin only allowed Title IX damages for intentional discrimination, it is
assumed that compensatory and punitive damages would only be available for intentional dis-
crimination against an employee covered by Title IX.").
41 See, e.g., Ernst v. W. States Chiropractic Coll., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 28500, at *2 (9th Cir.
1999) (reinstating a $150,000 punitive damages judgment in a Title IX lawsuit); Reich v. Cam-
bridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1194 (1st Cir. 1994) (interpreting the Franklin presump-
tion of a full remedy to allow for [punitive] damages for violations of the implied right of action
under a parallel act to Title IX). But see Canty v. Old Rochester Reg'l Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp. 2d
66, 69 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[1It is unclear whether the Franklin Court meant to include punitive
damages against municipal entities as part of 'all available remedies.'").
42 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) ("Cohen F), aft'd, 991 F.2d 888 (lst Cir. 1993) ("Cohen IT),
affid on remand, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) ("Cohen 11"), affd in part, revd in part, 101 F.3d
155 (lst Cir. 1996) ("Cohen IV').
43 See Barrett v. W. Chester Univ., 2003 WrL 22803477, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2003) (order-
ing the University to reinstate its women's gymnastics team); Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 1001
(granting an injunction reinstating previously eliminated women's teams to varsity status at the
school).
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the application of Title IX,44 and the extremely contentious Mercer
litigation certainly provided no cause for optimism.
Heather Sue Mercer arrived at Duke in the fall of 1994 as a former
all-state kicker at Yorktown Heights High School in New York 5 As a
high school student, she was featured by The New York Times for her
kicking ability and interest in pursuing what was traditionally an all-46
male sport. At the time, Mercer herself even admitted, "I think it's
kind of ridiculous how much attention I'm getting."47 After arriving
at Duke, her interest in, and attempts to try out for, the varsity foot-
ball team garnered national attention, and were welcomed by both
Head Coach Frank Goldsmith and the university.4 Her brightest
highlight was kicking the winning field goal in the team's spring
scrimmage in 1995. Somewhere along the way, however, things
would go terribly wrong and Mercer was dismissed from the football
team later that year. 0 She graduated from Duke in May of 1998, hav-
ing already filed a Title IX lawsuit against the university which
granted her degree. Coach Goldsmith was fired later that year, fol-
lowing the 1998 football season, although it was his fourth consecu-
tive losing campaign.5' He would later claim at trial that letting Mer-
cer join the football team was the worst decision of his life. 2 As the
tide for changes in Title IX began to swell in 2002 and 2003, 5  the
Mercer case became a symbol of the struggle for gender equity and
equality in athletics.
Mercer's lawsuit was initially dismissed with prejudice by District
Judge N. Carlton Tilley. Because football is a "contact sport" under
the Department of Education's implementing regulations," Judge
SeeAndrew A. Ingrum, Comment, Civil Rights: Title IX and College Athletics: Is There a Viable
Compromise?, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 755 (1995) (detailing the history of conflict in gender equity dis-
putes).
45 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1999).
46 Kate Stone Lombardi, Somewhere Over the Goal Post a Girl's Dream Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1993, Sunday late ed., § 13WC, at 1.
4 Id.
48 See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 530-32 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (providing a fac-
tual background on Mercer's tryouts and attempts to join the team).
49 Id. at 530.
5 Id.
51 Mark Schlabach, Out with the Old ... ; ... In with the New: College Football Coaching Derby,
ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Dec. 2, 1998, at El.
52 Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
53 DianaJean Schemo, Women's Athletics; Title IX Reformers Keep Men in Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 2003, at D1 (discussing a special commission established to review Title IX and submit
changes to the Department of Education in 2002 and 2003).
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 32 F. Supp. 2d 836, 838 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1998) provides in pertinent part:
[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where se-
lection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact
sport .... [W]here a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for
1198 [Vol. 6:5
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Tilley reasoned that Duke and Goldsmith had no obligation to allow
Mercer, or any female, onto its football team, so it could not be held
liable for discrimination." While contact sports like football are
counted in the Title IX calculations of equal funding and total avail-
able opportunities for each gender, they are exempted from having
to provide equal opportunities for each gender in that particular con-
tact sport.Y7  This determination was consistent with the original in-
tent of Title IX which was that, as Senator Bayh had put it, "We are
not requiring that intercollegiate football be desegregated, nor that
the men's locker room be desegregated."-
8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that "where a
university has allowed a member of the opposite sex to tryout for a
single-sex team in a contact sport, the university is... subject to Title
IX and therefore prohibited from discriminating against that indi-
vidual on the basis of sex."59 This result is somewhat peculiar because
it would appear to limit opportunities for women, in direct conflict
with Title IX's purpose. For example, had Goldsmith initially refused
Mercer a tryout on the sole basis of her gender, both he and Duke
would have been beyond the reaches of Title IX and within the safe
harbor of the Department of Education's implementing regulations.
60
By allowing Mercer to try out, however, Duke and Goldsmith for-
feited their right to rely on the "contact sports" exemption later, and
thus became bound by the law.61 The solution for schools in the fu-
ture would therefore be to not allow the opportunities for women in
the first place, shutting the door at the outset. Such a result appears
at odds with Title IX. Mercer's stated goal of using her $2 million
award to finance scholarships for female kickers 2 (had it been al-
lowed to stand) might have found few possible recipients because of
this result.
After the Fourth Circuit's reversal and remand, the case pro-
ceeded to trial in the fall of 2000 under DistrictJudge James Beaty in
members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the opposite
sex.., the members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered
unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part, contact sports
include ... football ....
Id.
56 Mercer, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
57 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1998).
117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (1971).
59 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1999).
60 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1998).
61 The Fourth Circuit felt that this was consistent with Title IX's intent. See Mercer, 190 F.3d
at 647 ("[T]he reading of the regulation we adopt today ... ensures that the ... indisputable
congressional intent to prohibit discrimination in all circumstances where such discrimination
is unreasonable-for example, where the university itself has voluntarily opened the team in
question to members of both sexes-is not frustrated.").
62 Jerry Crowe,Jury Awards Female Kicker $2 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000, at D14.
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Durham, North Carolina. Judge Beaty conducted a bifurcated pro-
ceeding on the issues of liability and damages.63 After extensive tes-
timony regarding Mercer's ability relative to the other "walk-on" (i.e.,
non-scholarship) field goal kickers,6 Goldsmith's gender-disparaging65 
T y ha 
•h•ad
remarks, and the university's failure to intervene, the jury had had
enough. They determined that Goldsmith had discriminated against
Mercer on the basis of her gender and that Duke was liable for the
discrimination under Title IX. In the separate damages proceeding,
the jury awarded Mercer just one dollar in compensatory damages,
but $2 million in punitive damages.67
Included in its flurry of post-trial motions,68 Duke challenged the
availability of punitive damages as a Title IX remedy." Judge Beaty,
looking to the "authority established in Franklin... and subsequent
court rulings," concluded that "punitive damages are available for
private rights of action brought pursuant to Title IX."'7 After a dis-
cussion of Franklin and the presumption that "all appropriate reme-
dies [are available] unless Congress has expressly indicated other-. ,71
wise, Judge Beaty turned to a recent Fourth Circuit opinion. In
Pandazides v. Virginia Board of Education, that court held that7?unitive
damages were available under a parallel statute to Title IX. Addi-
tionally, a number of other district courts had agreed that the "full
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d, 525, 535 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
Evidence was submitted that Mercer was "at least as skillful at place kicking" as another
male kicker who was not cut from the team. Id. at 537.
Goldsmith, in a meeting with Mercer and her mother, apparently explained that his
daughter had outgrown "little boys' games" and advised Mercer that she should, likewise, "out-
grow her interest" in playing football. Goldsmith further recommended that Mercer consider
trying out for the cheerleading squad. He commented on "how pretty she was and informed
her that when people asked him what she looked like, he compared her to the actress Molly
Ringwald." Id. at 532.
There was evidence that both the university's President Nan Keohane and Athletic Direc-
tor Tom Butters were aware of allegations of gender discrimination but did nothing. Id. at 541.
67 Id.
68 Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial
and/or remittitur. Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys' fees. Id. at 529.
9 Id.
70 Id. at 544-45.
71 Id. at 544.
7 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding, in light of Franklin, that punitive damages are avail-
able because they are part of the "full panoply" of remedies). It is noteworthy that the Fourth
Circuit felt bound to reverse prior precedent on the question of punitive damages because of
the decision in Franklin. Id. at 830. The statute, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
provided in pertinent part that, "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (West. Supp. 1993).
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panoply" of Franklin included punitive damages.73 Judge Beaty ac-
cordingly denied Duke's and Goldsmith's motions, entered judgment
for Mercer, and awarded attorneys' fees and costs.
7 4
Duke and Goldsmith decided to try their luck again in the Fourth
Circuit, claiming the lack of availability of punitive damages in Title
IX private actions as their principal argument on appeal.7  After oral
arguments, the court placed the case in abeyance to await the Su-
76preme Court's decision in Barnes v. Gorman, regarding the availabil-
ity of punitive damages under the same statute at issue in Pandazides.77
The Gorman opinion in April 2002 thus served as the basis for the
Fourth Circuit's short, unreported opinion, in which it held that the
"conclusion in Gorman that punitive damages are not available under
Title VI compels the conclusion that punitive damages are not avail-
able for private actions brought to enforce Title IX."78 The Fourth
Circuit thus vacated the award of punitive damages and remanded
the case for reconsideration of the award of $388,799.83 in fees and
expenses to Mercer. 79 Despite governing precedent that suggested
fees would not be appropriate in this case, ° the District Court ulti-
mately awarded her attorneys $349,243.96 earlier this year.8' In an in-
stant, though, Duke and Goldsmith were financially absolved of the
conduct that ajury had determined was egregious enough to warrant
a $2 million punishment. Simply put, it is extremely difficult to rec-
oncile this result with Title IX's purpose and history.
73 Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (citing Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp.
2d. 820, 829-30 (D. Md. 1998); Burns-Vidlak ex rel. Burns v. Chandler, 980 F. Supp. 1144, 1147
(D. Haw. 1997)).
74 Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 553-54.
75 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 50 Fed. Appx. 643, 644 (4th Cir. 2002).
76 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
77 Mercer, 50 Fed. Appx. at 644.
78 Id.
79 Although the Fourth Circuit did not explicitly refer to the amount, the district court opin-
ion included the calculation, which consisted of $340,939.50 of attorneys' fees and $47,860.33
for expenses. See Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 553-54.
80 Mercer had moved to recover attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2002). Mer-
cer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 553. Under this statute, the court may award "a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs" to a "prevailing plaintiff." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Supreme Court,
though, has held that "when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages ... the only reasonable
fee is usually no fee at all." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992). Justice O'Connor's con-
currence in Farrar, the decisive vote, would have allowed fees to be awarded only if Mercer
could show either the significance of the issue on which she prevailed or the public purpose
served in her victory. See id. at 121-23 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
81 Mercer v. Duke Univ., 301 F. Supp. 454, 470 (M.D.N.C.Jan. 22, 2004).
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III
Because the Fourth Circuit relied so heavily on the Gorman deci-
sion,"' it is necessary to take a closer look at the case's circumstances
and the Supreme Court's analysis. Plaintiff Jeffrey Gorman, a para-
plegic, had sued various members of the Kansas City police following
an incident in which he was injured due to their failure to make ap-
propriate accommodations for his disability. 3 A jury returned a ver-
dict in his favor awarding over $1 million in compensatory damages
and $1.2 million in punitive damages, and the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed.84 The sole issue before the Supreme Court was the availability
of punitive damages pursuant to the provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act under which he brought his action. In an opinion by
Justice Scalia, the Court reversed the two lower courts, holding puni-
tive damages to be an unavailable remedy.
The Court based its holding on several factors relevant to the
availability of punitive damages in Mercer's Tide IX suit. First, the act
under which Gorman sued specifically declared that the "remedies,
procedures, and rights" of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
were to serve as its basis."5 Title IX, although frequently interpreted
consistently with Tite VI,86 contains no such express limitation on its
available panoply of remedies. So while Title VI was statutorily lim-
ited by Congress, Title IX was enacted in the face of Supreme Court
precedent providing for the "use of any available remedy to make
good the wrong done.",7  Secondly, and more importantly, the
Court's Gorman analysis noted that Title VI specifically invokes Con-
gress's power under the Spending Clause, and that this constitutional
authority implicates a whole host of contract law concerns.8 In con-
trast, however, Title IX does not expressly acknowledge a constitu-
tional source of authority, and the Supreme Court in Franklin had
82 See Mercer, 50 Fed. Appx. at 644 ("[T]he Supreme Court's conclusion in Barnes that puni-
tive damages are not available under Title VI compels the conclusion that punitive damages are
not available for private actions brought to enforce Title IX.").
83 Gorman, 536 U.S. at 183. The basis of the complaint was as follows: Gorman lacked volun-
tary control over his lower torso, including his bladder, and was forced to wear a catheter at-
tached to a urine bag around his waist. After getting into an altercation at a nightclub, a police
van arrived to take Gorman to the police station. The van was not equipped to handle a wheel-
chair, and the harness system employed by the police proved ineffective. During the trip, Gor-
man came loose and fell to the floor of the van, which ruptured his urine bag and injured his
shoulder. He has since suffered serious medical problems as a result of that incident. He sued
under § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Id. at 184.
84 Gorman v. Easley, 257 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001).
85 92 Stat. 2983.
86 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-98.
87 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
Gorman, 536 U.S. at 186-87.
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explicitly left the question open despite Justice Scalia's mischaracteri-
zation in Gorman. The Fourth Circuit in Mercer, however, ignored
this question altogether, refusing to distinguish between Title VI and
Title IX, simply saying the two are "interpreted and applied in the
same manner."9 This interpretation blatantly ignores the differences
between the laws discussed above, and flies in the face of scholarship
which contends that Congress's ability to legislate against sex dis-
crimination is specifically derived from the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments.9' If this is in fact the case, there is no justifica-
tion for binding Title IX to Spending Clause jurisprudence.
Congress both explicitly and implicitly used different language in
writing the two laws, so any attempt to treat Title VI and Title IX
identically appears to be little more than judicial expediency.
However, even if one is to accept that Title IX is appropriately lim-
ited by the Court's Spending Clause jurisprudence, the opinions in
Gorman and Mercer still went too far. By rehashing the notice re-
quirement it had seemingly dismissed in Franklin, Gorman attempted
to interject the contract law analogy into the Franklin remedy deci-
sion.92 The analogy is that Spending Clause legislation is predicated
on the theory that there is a contract between the government and
the recipient regarding the receipt of the money. Because the re-
cipient had no notice that he could face punitive damages for a
breach, as the theory goes, he cannot be exposed to liability of that
nature. As Justice Scalia stated in Gorman,
When a federal-funds recipient violates conditions of Spending Clause
legislation, the wrong done is the failure to provide what the contractual
obligation requires; and that wrong is "made good" when the recipient
compensates the Federal Government or a third-party beneficiary (as in
this case) for the loss caused by that failure.9
89 Compare Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992) (noting that
the Court "need not decide which power Congress utilized in enacting Title IX"), with Gorman,
536 U.S. at 187 (referring to the Franklin case as a "private suit[] under Spending Clause legisla-
tion").
90 Mercer, 50 Fed. Appx. at 644.
91 See generally Emily Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Author-
ity for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1977) (discussing
the authority for sex discrimination legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
92 See Leading Cases: L Constitutional Law: G. Spending Clause, 116 HARV. L. REV. 312, 312
(2002):
[T]he Court took a potentially significant step toward limiting the reach of Spending
Clause legislation .... The reasoning in Gorman, which extends the Court's longstand-
ing analogy between Spending Clause legislation and contracts to the area of remedies,
creates new uncertainties about how broadly the Court will apply contract law principles
to limit the scope of such legislation.
Id.
93Gormnan, 536 U.S. at 189.
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This statement, particularly when utilized in the civil rights context,
misses the point of government legislation in the first place. Again,
the Mercer court failed to address this difference between Title VI and
Title IX.
The Gorman decision, and the Fourth Circuit's subsequent reli-
ance on Mercer, fly in the face of other remedies precedent: Just ten
years before Gorman, the Franklin Court willingly reaffirmed the clas-
sic presumption of all available remedies unless Congress expressly
indicated otherwise.94 It is difficult to reconcile the two, even in the
face of the contract analogy. Does Duke really need to have notice
that it might face a punitive damages award that amounted to just 1%
of the federal funding received by the university in the 1997-1998 fi-
nancial year?95 This hardly seems outside the scope of "appropriate
relief,"96 nor does it appear to be such an extensive unforeseen "liabil-
ity" in the face of which Duke would have turned down the funding
rather than expose itself.
97
Justice Scalia's attempt in Gorman to rely on the basic contract law
analogy that "when a court concludes that a recipient has breached
its contract, it should enforce the broken promise by protecting the
expectation that the recipient would not discriminate," is unconvinc-
ing when applied to Title IX.98 The nature of discrimination is inher-
ently different in the educational context than it is in other contexts,
such as a workplace environment. Interpreting Title IX exactly like
Title VI ignores these differences. Students, and student-athletes es-
pecially, can not merely be placed "in as good a position as they
would have been had the contract been performed" because they
face extreme time constraints.99 Mercer had been a college graduate
for over two years before her claim even went to trial; the jury could
not merely restore her athletic eligibility. As Mercer herself said over
a decade ago, "I just thought, wow, football looks like something I
would really enjoy. And I do. I love it."'00 How can any court make
someone like this "whole" again when it is clearly impossible? The
most appropriate "remedy to make good the wrong done" must then
be punitive damages. 0' Any other remedy falls short of Title IX's
94 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 69-71.
95 Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 551. The actual percentage could be even lower considering
that the alleged discrimination took place over a period of more than two years.
96 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73.
97 Grman, 536 U.S. at 187.
98 Id. at 189 (quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 633 (1983) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting)).
9 Id.
too Lombardi, supra note 46, at 1.
101 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
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purpose, and allows violating institutions to shirk responsibility for
their discriminatory conduct.
The Fourth Circuit's decision presents one additional peculiarity.
First, the court chose without explanation not to publish its opinion.
The immediate effect of this is that the holding will carry no prece-
dential weight in the circuit. '°2 In deciding what appeared to be such
an easy case for the court after Gorman, one can only speculate why
the court took this step. Perhaps the Fourth Circuit's opinion can be
interpreted as attempting to right the wrong it committed in its first
decision interpreting the contact sports exception.0 3  When con-
fronted with the seeming absurdity of the result from the district
court trial, the circuit court may have sensed the trouble it had cre-
ated two years earlier. That a jury could value Mercer's lost playing
time and illegally crushed dream at $1, yet value the reprehensibility
of Duke and Goldsmith's conduct at $2 million, was certainly enough
to raise the circuit court's collective eyebrow.
IV
The Fourth Circuit's Mercer decision in 2002 contributed to the
growing tide pushing to weaken Title IX. The lack of availability of
punitive damages in private actions to enforce the law removes a sig-
nificant threat against non-compliance. To see the effects of this, one
needs to look no further than the Mercer case. Instead of facing po-
tential damages of $2 million for its discriminatory conduct, Duke ul-
timately paid out damages in the sum of $.104 To justify these widely
different results on a Spending Clause contract-law notice theory is
grossly inadequate. To conveniently treat Title IX as a statutory clone
of Title VI is irresponsible, and ignores several important differences
in the two laws that warrant separate treatment and judicial interpre-
tation. Title IX's initial and continuing purposes both warrant a
more equitable result. The result here completely glosses over the
nature of the defendant's conduct, which was intentional here, treat-
ing it as no worse than negligent behavior. In Mercer, it is hard to see
how federal funds are not "subsidizing gender bias" °05 when Duke is
allowed to escape a bill that ajury felt was an appropriate penalty for
its severe misconduct.
102 See U.S.C.S. Cr. App. 4TH CIR., LOCAL RULE 36(B) (2002) (explaining the effect of unpub-
lished decisions by the court).
103 See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding Duke could not rely
on the "contact sports" safe harbor because it allowed Mercer to try out).
104 This, of course, does not include the attorneys fees of $349,243.96 Duke had to pay Mer-
cer, seeMercerv. Duke Univ., 301 F. Supp. 454, 470 (M.D.N.C.Jan. 22, 2004), nor the fees Duke
had to pay for its own representation.
105 Terry, supra note 18, at 715-18.
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How would the government choose to address some of the prob-
lems that have arisen under Title IX? In Franklin, the United States
filed an amicus brief urging the Court to refuse monetary relief and
to reconsider the implied right of action grant in Cannon.10 6 Such
changes would have a potentially devastating effect on Title IX en-
forcement litigation. Other than a brief foray in 1987, Congress has
been far too content to let the judiciary shape Title IX. After Gorman
and Mercer, it is high time for Congress to get off the bench and get
into the game. Congress needs to respond to the question of Title
IX's constitutional authority, and the remedies that are available in
both law and equity. It can no longer rely on the federal courts to
clean up a mess it created so many years ago. Admittedly, no reform
will allow Heather Sue Mercer to kick a football in a Duke uniform
ever again. Nonetheless, her case is a fascinating insight into the im-
portant role punitive damages can play in Title IX litigation and cast-
ing strong doubt on their future availability.
-Charles L. Rombeau*
106 Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60
(1992) (No. 90-918).
. J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., Duke University.
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